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GOING ROGUE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
NEWFOUND HOSTILITY TO POLICY-BASED
BIVENS CLAIMS
Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander Reinert & James E. Pfander*
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), the Supreme Court held that a proposed
Bivens remedy was subject to an exacting special factors analysis when the claim arises in a
“new context.” In Ziglar itself, the Court found the context of the plaintiffs’ claims to be “new”
because, in the Court’s view, they challenged “large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners.” Bivens claims for damages caused by
unconstitutional policies, the Court suggested, were inappropriate.
This Essay critically examines the Ziglar Court’s newfound hostility to policy-based Bivens
claims. We show that an exemption for policy challenges can claim no support in the Court’s
own development of the Bivens doctrine, or in the principles that animate the Court’s broader
approach to government accountability law. Equally troubling, the policy exemption has already
caused substantial confusion among lower courts. Judging that it lacks a legitimate predicate
and defies coherent application, we conclude that the Court should pursue no further its hostility
to policy-based Bivens claims.
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INTRODUCTION
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,1 the
Supreme Court recognized the right to sue federal officials for damages
when they have violated constitutional protections.2 By 1980, the Court had
recognized a right to bring a Bivens claim in three distinct settings.3 But in
the decades since, the Court has progressively limited this power to sue.4
Under today’s two-step approach, courts first inquire whether the claim arises
in a settled context—that is, whether it is sufficiently similar to the Court’s
three prior decisions recognizing a Bivens action for damages.5 If so, then
the action can proceed. If, however, the court perceives the context as
“new,” then it should ask if special factors counsel hesitation in the recognition of a right to sue.6 The tendency in recent Supreme Court decisions has
been to view narrowly the scope of established rights to sue, first finding
almost all contexts “new,” and then invoking the more searching special factors analysis. In addition, the Court has enunciated a growing list of special
factors that inform judicial restraint. The upshot is that litigants are often
barred from seeking Bivens relief, even when the factual differences between
their claims and prior Bivens cases appear trivial.7
1 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2 Id. at 397.
3 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980) (recognizing a Bivens claim for an
Eighth Amendment violation); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234–35, 243–49 (1979)
(same for Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause violations stemming from employment
discrimination); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90, 397 (same for Fourth Amendment violations).
4 For an account of the Court’s increasing skepticism of Bivens actions, see James E.
Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays
When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 574–78 (2020).
5 The Court’s opinion in Schweiker v. Chilicky was the first to characterize this
approach in terms of whether a claim arose in a “new context[ ].” 487 U.S. 412, 421
(1988). For one overall critique of the Court’s new context approach, see Alexander A.
Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 1473, 1498–1504 (2013).
6 See, e.g., Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020).
7 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 2020), is illustrative. The plaintiff in Oliva brought claims under the Fourth Amendment against federal
officers who allegedly used excessive force. Id. at 441. Even though Bivens itself also
involved Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force against federal officers, the Fifth
Circuit found the context in Oliva to be “new” because it arose in a hospital, not a private
home, because the dispute giving rise to the use of force was not the same as the narcotics
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In Ziglar v. Abbasi,8 the Court redefined more contexts as “new” and
added considerably to the special factors analysis.9 Facing a challenge to the
constitutionality of the detention policy that the Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) developed in response to the 9/
11 attacks in New York City, the Ziglar Court narrowly defined settled law and
treated the claims in question as arising in a “new context.”10 Turning to the
second question, the Ziglar Court gave voice to a long list of special factors,
including the burden and distraction of litigation, the presence of national
security concerns, and the threat of personal liability.11 For these and other
reasons, the Court found that the responsibility for recognizing a right to
challenge detention policies via damages suits fell to Congress and was not
the proper subject of a Bivens action.12
Ziglar’s laundry list of special factors, though somewhat familiar,
included an entirely novel consideration—an expression of concern that the
claims in question sought to challenge national detention policy as formulated by high-ranking executive branch officials.13 According to the plaintiffs, the officials in question, Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director
Robert Mueller, and Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner
James Ziglar, collaborated in the development and implementation of the
government’s hold-until-cleared policy.14 Under the terms of the policy, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, Arab and South Asian Muslim men detained after 9/
11 were confined in extremely harsh conditions until they were cleared of
any connection to the terrorist attacks and then deported.15 Many of the
men sought damages under Bivens, both from the jailers who implemented
the policy and from the high-ranking executive branch architects of the policy.16 But the Court viewed these challenges to the government’s detention
policy as an inappropriate use of the Bivens action.17 Unlike settled uses of
investigation at issue in Bivens, and because the plaintiff in Oliva was placed in a
chokehold, whereas the plaintiff in Bivens was manacled and strip-searched. Id. at 442–43.
Having found that the plaintiff’s claims arose in a meaningfully different context from
Bivens, the Fifth Circuit went on to hold that special factors counseled against implying a
new Bivens remedy for the plaintiff in Oliva. Id. at 443–44.
8 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
9 Id. at 1859–60.
10 Id. at 1859–60, 1864. In the interest of full disclosure, we note that Alexander Reinert was one of the lawyers who represented the respondents in Ziglar before the Supreme
Court, and he continues to represent them in district court.
11 Id. at 1860–61. We have previously found no empirical basis for the Ziglar Court’s
concern with the personal liability of government officials. See Pfander et al., supra note 4,
at 566 (concluding on the basis of settlement data that the government holds individuals
harmless in 95% of the successful Bivens suits brought against federal prison officers, virtually eliminating the threat of personal liability).
12 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1864–65.
13 Id. at 1859–61.
14 Id. at 1852–53.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1865.
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Bivens litigation to challenge individual instances of “discrimination or law
enforcement overreach,” the Court characterized the detention policy claims
as seeking to contest “large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions
of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners.”18
The Ziglar Court rested its hostility to policy-based Bivens claims on three
different considerations. First, the Court suggested that Bivens claims had
never served as a “a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy,”19 but
instead had served “to deter the officer.”20 Second, the Court indicated that
damages actions challenging government policy were an improper way to
influence policies, worrying that the “burden and demand of litigation”
might distract high level officials from meeting the needs of their position.21
The worry was said to reflect both the practicalities of discovery as well as the
potential for judicial interference “with sensitive functions of the Executive
Branch.”22 In Ziglar itself, these concerns were amplified by the Court’s tendentious claim that the risk of damages liability, more so than injunctive
relief, might “cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions concerning national-security policy” because of the supposed risk of
personal financial loss.23 Finally, the Court suggested, alternative remedial
methods—such as habeas petitions and claims for injunctive relief—were
better suited than Bivens claims to challenge government policies.24
In this Essay, we offer three arguments against the Ziglar Court’s suggestion that plaintiffs may not seek damages for injuries caused by an unconstitutional federal government policy. We begin in Part I by examining the
purported doctrinal roots of the hostility to policy-based claims. Rather than
finding it well grounded in prior decisions, we show that Ziglar’s policy concern represents a novel, indeed wholly unprecedented, departure from prior
law. Part II shows that Ziglar’s concern with the costs of policy-based damages claims contravenes the assumptions on which the Court has built its
rules of government accountability. Recognizing that damages actions can
be brought to challenge state and local government policies, the Court has
assumed that these suits can influence government practices through a vari18 Id. at 1862.
19 Id. at 1860 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)).
20 Id. (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994)).
21 Id. For its part, the government’s briefing suggested that damages litigation for
unconstitutional policies was unwarranted based on precedent like Malesko, separation of
powers grounds, and fiscal concerns. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74. The government argued
that, to the extent one should account for concerns that unconstitutional policies might
pose a greater risk to individual liberty than discrete unconstitutional conduct, awaiting a
legislative response, rather than an implied cause of action, was “more likely[ ] and more
beneficial.” Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 8–9, Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1359),
2017 WL 117334, at *8–9. In the meantime, injunctive relief was available to prevent
unconstitutional policies from continuing. Id. at 10; Brief for the Petitioners at 24–25,
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1359), 2016 WL 6873020, at *24–25.
22 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–61.
23 Id. at 1861.
24 Id. at 1862–63.
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ety of pressures. The Court’s assertion in Ziglar that damages actions may be
an inappropriate means of contesting unlawful government practices represents a dramatic break with these prior decisions. Part III offers a more practical objection: the Ziglar Court does not offer clear guidance about what
constitutes a policy decision inappropriate for resolution as a Bivens claim.
Lower courts have disagreed about how to apply Ziglar’s policy concern and,
at least in some circuits, Ziglar appears to threaten the viability of even wellsettled forms of Bivens liability.
Part IV offers our most charitable understanding of Ziglar—as an invocation of the Court’s longstanding preference for alternative remedial measures, including habeas and injunctive relief, as a means of addressing
unconstitutional policies. But we also explain why the Court’s asserted preference for remedial alternatives, while perhaps attractive on the page, is less
desirable on the ground. For one thing, lower courts demonstrate equal confusion about the availability of remedial alternatives as about the boundaries
of the policy exception in Ziglar. In addition, the Court has made the remedial alternatives it touts in Ziglar virtually impossible to achieve because it has
erected doctrinal barriers against obtaining those alternative remedies. In
the end, we conclude that the limitation on policy-based claims cannot be
coherently applied in ways that accomplish the Ziglar Court’s stated goal of
preserving a viable Bivens action to deter unconstitutional conduct. We
therefore suggest that the Court abandon its attempt to limit the applicability
of Bivens in cases challenging government policies. Whatever one might say
for the Court’s sundry explanations for limiting Bivens, the Ziglar Court’s
concern with policy-based claims lacks merit.
I.

THE ILLUSORY DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR ZIGLAR’S HOSTILITY
CLAIMS

TO

POLICY

We begin with a focus on the Court’s suggestion that its jurisprudence
has long featured hostility to policy-based Bivens claims. Contrary to its insinuation, the Court had never questioned the availability of Bivens claims seeking damages for unconstitutional policies prior to Ziglar. Indeed, prior cases
had suggested the opposite, namely that policy-based claims could be cognizable under Bivens. This reading of the caselaw is supported by the Office of
the Solicitor General’s contemporaneous briefing, which had never argued
that Bivens was flat out unavailable where claims were based on unconstitutional policies.25 If anything, both the Court and the government had long
assumed that, while policy-based claims might implicate the personal involvement requirement or the qualified immunity defense, Bivens claims brought
25 The Solicitor General represents the interests of the United States before the Court,
and it has routinely represented high-level officials sued for damages under Bivens.
Although briefs filed by the Solicitor General’s Office are pieces of advocacy, not dispositive statements of the law, we assume the Office would have raised objections to policybased Bivens claims if that were a fair reading of the Court’s caselaw.
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against individuals directly responsible for unconstitutional policies would
otherwise be available.
A.

The Role of Policy in Early Bivens Cases

The Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1970s and 1980s routinely assumed
that Bivens cases were available to challenge policies.26 Some opinions during this time period did question whether Bivens defendants sued for their
policy decisions were entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. But the
Court’s focus on immunity only underscores the presumed availability of policy-based damages claims.27 In Butz v. Economou,28 for example, the Court
made clear that a federal official could not avoid liability for violations of the
federal Constitution, even when he was making decisions at the policy level.29
Even when an official could claim authorization under positive law, unconstitutional acts, including policy decisions, would vitiate any claim for immunity.30 Butz articulated no concerns about holding officials accountable for
unconstitutional policymaking.31 To the contrary, Butz recognized the dissonance created by providing greater protection from liability to policymaking
officials than to line officers, precisely because “the greater power of such
officials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct.”32
Later cases during this period adhered to the view that Bivens claims
could challenge federal government policy—and concluded that the defend26 Some were brought against high-level executive officials with the Court’s blessing
and without any hint of the policy limitation it set out in Ziglar. See Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (holding that director of Bureau of Prisons did not “enjoy such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies
against [him] might be inappropriate”).
27 Consistent with our account in Part II below, throughout these cases, the Court took
pains to acknowledge the importance of damages actions against high-level policymakers
precisely because they could cause widespread harm.
28 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
29 Id. at 506–08. Butz addressed only the scope of immunity available to the individual
defendants, because no party raised any question as to whether a Bivens claim was available. Typical of its time, the lower court’s decision in Butz treated Bivens liability as similar
to § 1983 liability, despite the different provenance of the causes of action. Economou v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 535 F.2d 688, 695 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
30 Butz, 438 U.S. at 490–91 (first citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218–23
(1882); and then citing Va. Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 285–92 (1885)); id. at 494–95
(“Whatever level of protection from state interference is appropriate for federal officials
executing their duties under federal law, it cannot be doubted that these officials, even
when acting pursuant to congressional authorization, are subject to the restraints imposed
by the Federal Constitution.”).
31 Id. at 498.
32 Id. at 505–06. This was in contrast to then-Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in part
on the grounds that there was a “compelling reason” for distinguishing between § 1983
and Bivens actions in terms of whether high-level federal officials should maintain an
immunity from damages. Id. at 524–25 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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ants were not entitled to any sort of immunity, either. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,33 the defendants argued that they should be absolutely immune from
Bivens liability for policy-level decisionmaking.34 But the Court rejected this
argument, citing Butz for the proposition that “an executive official’s claim to
absolute immunity must be justified by reference to the public interest in the
special functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station.”35 And in
Mitchell v. Forsyth,36 the Court rejected absolute immunity for the Attorney
General’s actions in the national security context precisely because, contra
Ziglar, it did not expect the prospect of litigation to have any impact on the
Attorney General’s performance of his duties.37 The Court considered liability in this context—mediated by qualified immunity—necessary because
none of the “built-in restraints” that characterized the judicial and legislative
branches applied to executive branch decisions regarding national security.38
And although the Court rejected some Bivens cases in which plaintiffs
directly based their claims on application of federal policy, the Court never
suggested that Bivens was an inapplicable remedy for a policy challenge. In
United States v. Stanley,39 the plaintiff sued because he was secretly administered LSD as part of an Army-approved plan to study chemical agents.40 The
government argued that he should not be permitted to sue, not because he
sought to challenge a policy but because his lawsuit threatened to interfere
with decisions related to the management of the military, implicating distinct
separation of powers concerns.41 The Court agreed, finding that “congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.”42 The plaintiffs in Schweiker v. Chilicky specifically attacked policies
adopted by the defendants to administer federal disability benefits, arguing
that the policies violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.43 The
Court found that Bivens was unavailable not because the plaintiffs had challenged a policy and sued policymakers, but because Congress had created an
33 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
34 Brief for Petitioners Harlow and Butterfield at 38–39, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Nos. 791738 and 80-945), 1981 WL 390511, at *38–39.
35 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812.
36 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
37 Id. at 521–22 (“Whereas the mere threat of litigation may significantly affect the
fearless and independent performance of duty by actors in the judicial process, it is
unlikely to have a similar effect on the Attorney General’s performance of his national
security tasks.”).
38 Id. at 522–23. The Court also found injunctive and declaratory relief inadequate to
address the kinds of national security abuses alleged in Mitchell. Id. at 523 n.7.
39 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
40 Id. at 671.
41 Brief for the Petitioners at 28, Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (No. 86-393), 1987 WL 880383,
at *28.
42 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683. In this way, Stanley is a straightforward application of the
Court’s decision in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), which held that a race discrimination claim could not be brought via Bivens because it arose in the context of military
service. Id. at 300.
43 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1988).
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alternative remedy that provided adequate relief to the plaintiffs.44 Nor did
the government’s briefing raise any issue concerning the inapplicability of
Bivens remedies for policy challenges, instead focusing on the remedy created by Congress.45
In short, Bivens jurisprudence from the 1970s and 1980s, along with
cases generally addressed to the liability of government officials, betrayed
none of the Ziglar Court’s skepticism toward policy-based claims brought
against high-level officials. Instead, the cases suggest that individual liability
for high-level officials helps to ensure accountability for unconstitutional
conduct that has wide-ranging impact.
B.

Ziglar’s Misrepresentation of Meyer and Malesko

The Ziglar Court found support for its hostility to policy-based claims in
two cases: Meyer and Malesko.46 But neither case supports Ziglar’s reading. In
Meyer, the Court found that Bivens was unavailable because the plaintiff
sought to sue an agency rather than an individual acting under color of federal law.47 Indeed, immediately after the Court rejected a cause of action
against the agency as a “significant extension” of Bivens, it reaffirmed the
plaintiff’s cause of action against Pattullo, the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation employee who terminated him, as one “that the logic
of Bivens supports—a Bivens claim for damages.”48 In other words, although
the Meyer Court disapproved of using Bivens to sue an entity for its policy, it
approved of suit against the individual officer who applied that policy to the
detriment of the plaintiff.
In Ziglar, the Court implied that Meyer disapproved of policy-based
claims because it viewed the deterrence of misconduct by individual officers,
rather than the challenge to government policies, as central to Bivens’s
logic.49 But Meyer’s discussion of the importance of deterrence arose in connection with the Court’s assessment of the operation of qualified immunity—
presumptively applicable to suits against officers and inapplicable to claims
brought against entities.50 If the claim against the entity were available, the
44 Id. at 425. Of course, Ziglar also rested in part on its perception that there were
alternative remedies available to challenge the policies at issue in that case. But the alternative remedies identified in Schweiker—which were congressionally created and offered
the prospect of monetary relief—were quite broader than the remedies identified in Ziglar,
which provided only prospective relief at best. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1865
(2017); Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424–25.
45 Brief for the Petitioners at 22–23, Schweiker, 487 U.S. 412 (No. 86-1781), 1987 WL
880510, at *22–23. For the role of alternative remedies in the Ziglar Court’s analysis and
our concerns, see infra Part IV.
46 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61
(2001).
47 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484–85.
48 Id. at 484–85.
49 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860 (stating that policy-based claims are disfavored because
Bivens claims serve “to deter the officer” (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485)).
50 See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
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Court reasoned, no one would sue the individual officer, thereby reducing
the deterrent value of Bivens claims.51 The Court had nothing to say about
any supposed mismatch between the individual deterrent purpose of Bivens
claims and the use of Bivens to challenge unconstitutional policies.
The notion that Bivens claims cannot be used to seek damages from individuals responsible for creating and implementing unconstitutional policies
was similarly absent from the government’s briefs.52 Rather, the briefs
expressed concern that claims against entities would implicate fiscal policy,
not the unconstitutional policy challenged in the plaintiff’s claim.53 Indeed,
the government never argued that Bivens claims could not attack unconstitutional policies, where those claims were brought against individual defendants. The government’s overriding argument was that Bivens claims should
not be brought against agencies, a view ultimately adopted by the Court.54
The second decision on which the Ziglar Court relied in support of its
assertion that Bivens claims cannot challenge policies, Malesko, was similarly
focused on the distinction between claims against officers and claims against
agencies.55 Like Meyer, it held that Bivens claims should run against individuals, not entities, because if plaintiffs could sue both, they would focus on the
latter, undermining individual deterrence.56 At the same time, the Malesko
Court recognized that Meyer permitted Bivens claims against individuals who
51 Id.
52 The government was focused on why a Bivens claim should not run against an
agency, even if individual officers could be liable under Bivens. The heart of the argument
was that three “special factors,” not present for claims against individuals, were implicated
by claims against agencies. See Brief for the FDIC at 25, Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (No. 92-741),
1993 WL 348895, at *25–26. First, while acknowledging the reality of indemnification, the
government argued that claims against agencies would implicate federal fiscal policy in a
special way because Congress had not appropriated federal funds to satisfy judgments
against agencies. See id. at 25–26 (comparing regulatory regime limiting indemnification
of individual defendants with the unlimited liability of agencies contemplated by the lower
court’s decision in Meyer). Second, the government analogized to the FTCA’s discretionary function exception to argue that Bivens claims should not be permitted to challenge an
agency’s policy choice. See id. at 26–28. But this argument was not framed as an argument
that Bivens claims could not be used to pursue damages remedies against individual policymakers. Instead, it centered on the reasons to hesitate before creating a claim against the
agency for unconstitutional claims where Congress had already spoken to the issue. See id.
at 27–28 (“The court of appeals’ decision to imply a Bivens remedy here impermissibly
expands judicial review of administrative and legislative policy choices in the face of Congress’s express prohibition of such review.”). Third, the government argued that the plaintiff could have pursued claims against the agency through a variety of alternative remedial
schemes. See id. at 28–29.
53 See id. at 25–26.
54 See id. (noting that even if fiscal impact from claims against individuals would be the
same because of indemnification, Congress had never authorized “the expenditure of federal funds to satisfy judgments in a court-authorized [damages] action” against an agency).
55 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
56 See id. at 69 (“[In Meyer, w]e reasoned that if given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a
federal agency instead of an individual who could assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.”); id. at 71 (“This case is, in every meaningful sense, the same. For if a corpo-
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are acting pursuant to policy.57 Indeed, even though the claim in Malesko
was based on the entity’s policy,58 it was the distinction between individual
and entity liability, not the policy basis for the claim, that animated the
entirety of the decision in Malesko.
Language from Malesko selectively quoted in Ziglar may appear to offer a
kernel of support but does not, read in context, stand for the proposition
that Bivens is unavailable to challenge policy. Malesko drew a distinction
between “the Bivens remedy, which we have never considered a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy,” and “injunctive relief” which “has long
been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting
unconstitutionally.”59 In context, however, this merely reflects the Court’s
intuition that suits for injunctive relief contest the constitutionality of current
and continuing practices and direct a prospective change in policy in appropriate cases, itself an unexceptional proposition. It does not address the
availability of damages claims against policymakers, or claims that challenge
unlawful policies. After all, the government conceded that Bivens liability in
a case like Malesko’s would be appropriate if the individual employees of a
private corporation were sued instead of the corporation itself.60 Nor did the
United States in Malesko argue that the policy basis for the claim precluded
Bivens—instead, the government relied on Meyer’s distinction between entity
and individual liability.61 Petitioners in Malesko went beyond the entity-individual distinction, noting that the “quintessential Bivens defendant” is “either
a line agent directly interacting with the public or an administrator directly
setting an entity’s policies.”62
Contemporaneous interpretation of Malesko and Meyer make clear that
they were not read as hostile to policy-based Bivens claims for damages. In
rate defendant is available for suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and
not the individual directly responsible for the alleged injury.”).
57 Id. at 70 (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473–74).
58 See id. at 64–65 (describing factual background).
59 Id. at 74.
60 Id. at 79 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he reasoning of the Court’s opinion
relies, at least in part, on the availability of a remedy against employees of private prisons.
[The Court noted] that Meyer ‘found sufficient’ a remedy against the individual officer,
‘which respondent did not timely pursue.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at
72 (majority opinion))); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 558228, at *11–12 (“The
parties do not dispute that federal prisoners in private facilities may bring equivalent
actions: a Bivens claim against the individuals responsible for the constitutional violation
and a tort suit against the correctional entity that employed those individuals.”).
61 See Brief for the United States, supra note 60, at 15–16; id. at 19–20 (“Here, as in
Meyer, providing a damages action against the corporate employer would undermine the
incentive for aggrieved parties to sue the individual directly responsible for their constitutional injuries.”).
62 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 1023502,
at *4 (2001); id. at 5 (“First, because plaintiffs can bring Bivens actions against individuals
who directly make policy for federal entities and entities acting under color of federal law,
it plainly is not necessary to have a Bivens action against the entity.”).
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Wilson v. Layne,63 the plaintiff brought claims against defendants who were
alleged to have acted pursuant to the U.S. Marshals Service’s media ridealong policy.64 The plaintiff sued both federal and state officials (under Bivens and § 1983, respectively) for allegedly violating the Fourth Amendment
by inviting a reporter and photographer to witness the execution of arrest
warrants for the plaintiff.65 The role of policy was not deemed relevant to
whether the plaintiff had a Bivens claim (no one questioned the existence of
the claim), and the Court squarely held that the media ride-along violated
the Fourth Amendment.66 But the existence of the policy was relevant to
whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity based in part on
reasonable reliance on the policy.67 And just as in prior cases, the government based its argument not on the unavailability of Bivens liability to challenge policy, but on the availability of qualified immunity.68 Lower courts
similarly applied Meyer to distinguish between Bivens claims against entities
and claims against individuals—instead of distinguishing between claims
alleging unconstitutional policies and claims alleging individual
misconduct.69
C.

The Role of Policy Post-Malesko

The trajectory of Bivens jurisprudence between Malesko and Ziglar is consistent with what we have described to this point. Even as the Court
expressed continuing hostility to Bivens actions in general, neither the government in its opposition to Bivens claims nor the Court in its rejection of
Bivens claims recognized or pressed the hostility to policy-based claims
announced in Ziglar. Despite numerous opportunities to argue against the
63 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
64 Id. at 607–08.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 614.
67 See id. at 615–17.
68 See Brief for Fed. Respondents Harry Layne, James A. Olivo, & Joseph L. Perkins at
39–40, Wilson, 526 U.S. 603 (No. 98-83), 1999 WL 38593, at *39–40 (“On the contrary, the
existence of the Marshals Service policy itself provides strong support for respondents’
claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity in this case.”).
69 See, e.g., Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (relying on
Malesko and Meyer for proposition that Bivens is unavailable when “challenging the conduct
or policy of a non-individual defendant”); Polanco v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 158 F.3d
647, 650–51, 651 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (characterizing Meyer as concerned with distinction
between agency liability and individual liability, in part because of availability of qualified
immunity defense); Kauffman v. Anglo-Am. Sch. of Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (“Meyer argued that if given a choice, plaintiffs would have every reason to sue a
federal agency instead of its individual officials, because this tactic would circumvent the
qualified-immunity defenses that the individuals might be expected to raise. . . . Accordingly, to recognize Bivens actions against federal agencies would undermine Bivens itself.”);
id. (declining to find Bivens remedy against private entity, relying on “Meyer’s logic [that]
provision of a damages remedy against a private entity would actively diminish the deterrent value of the remedy against the individual”); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 66 n.2 (2001) (citing Kauffman, 28 F.3d at 1227).
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imposition of Bivens liability for adoption of particular policies, the government refrained over this time from making such arguments, even as it argued
against the imposition of liability on other grounds. In Christopher v.
Harbury,70 a case implicating foreign policy, the United States as amicus
made no argument about barring Bivens claims based on policy, although it
did argue against extension of Bivens to the claim brought in that case.71
And in Wilkie v. Robbins,72 although the United States in its briefing
described the overlapping land management policies at stake in that decision, it did not seek to bar Bivens based on these policy implications,73 nor
did the Court base its decision on those concerns.74
Iqbal, of course, concerned a challenge to the same policies at issue in
Ziglar. The Court’s decision expressed no doubt regarding the availability of
a Bivens-type claim for damages caused by an allegedly unconstitutional policy.75 Indeed, when the Court analyzed the plaintiff’s complaint, it
addressed the claims challenging government policy and focused not on
whether this type of challenge could be brought as a Bivens claim but instead
on whether the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the defendants in question had adopted the policy for discriminatory reasons.76 The premise of the
government’s briefing in Iqbal was similar—it read Malesko and Meyer to
establish that “high-level federal officials may be held liable only for their
direct involvement in constitutional violations, or at least their deliberate
indifference in the face of information that the rights of others are being
violated.”77 To the extent the government argued that policymaking defendants should be protected from liability, their argument was located in the
qualified immunity defense, not the inapplicability of Bivens.78 By contrast,
the government’s discussion of the pleadings in Iqbal made clear their concession that high-level officials could be held liable under Bivens for personally creating an unconstitutional policy.79
70 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
71 Brief for Petitioners at 38–39, Christopher, 536 U.S. 403 (No. 01-394), 2002 WL
200675, at *38–39.
72 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
73 See Brief for the Petitioners at 2–4, Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 (No. 06-219), 2007 WL
128587, at *2–4.
74 See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 555–60 (conducting special factors analysis to conclude that
no Bivens remedy should be available, principally because of the difficulty in crafting a
judicially manageable standard). The Court’s opinion in Wilkie makes no reference to any
land management policies implicated by the plaintiff’s proposed cause of action.
75 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009) (referring to the need for Bivens
to be based on an individual defendant’s actions, not the actions of subordinates).
76 See id. at 680–81.
77 Brief for the Petitioners at 14, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4063957,
at *14.
78 See id. at 18–19.
79 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL
5009266, at *10–11 (“Thus, it is not sufficient simply to allege that a high-level officer was
‘instrumental’ or a ‘principal architect’ of a policy like the one respondent alleges.
Instead, there must be an actual factual basis in the complaint for concluding that such a
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Cases decided after Iqbal paint a similar picture. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd80
involved a challenge to a high-level policy decision made by the Attorney
General, but the Court based its decision on qualified immunity, not on
whether a Bivens action was available to challenge the Attorney General’s
conduct.81 And in Wood v. Moss,82 plaintiffs also based their claims on an
“actual but unwritten” Secret Service policy regarding how to police demonstrations against the President, but the Court did not question its viability on
that ground.83 Instead, the Court found insufficient allegations to support
the alleged policy or to connect the policy to the actions of the defendants.84
The government’s briefing in al-Kidd and Wood made no argument that the
viability of the claims in those cases was influenced by the fact that they were
policy-based.85 The government did not even cite to Malesko or Meyer in
their briefs.
And so we come to Ziglar. Reading the Court’s opinion in isolation, one
could be forgiven for assuming that the hostility to policy-based claims was
firmly ensconced in Bivens jurisprudence. As illustrated above, however, if
anything the opposite was true. Neither the Court nor the government attorneys arguing before it ever laid claim to the policy hostility articulated in
Ziglar. Rather, the running assumption guiding government briefs and
Supreme Court decisions was that Bivens claims could be deployed to seek
damages arising from unconstitutional policies and that policymakers could
be held liable where they directly implemented, via policy, unconstitutional
conduct. The Ziglar Court constructed its contrary suggestion, like much of
its Bivens jurisprudence, with smoke and mirrors.
II.

THE ZIGLAR COURT’S NOVEL DISDAIN FOR POLICY REFORM THROUGH
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

The Ziglar Court’s hostility to policy-based claims contradicts not only
prior Bivens doctrine but also, as we show in this Part, the Court’s own longstanding views about the role that constitutional tort claims can—and
should—play in a system of government accountability. In addition to the
misleading use of precedent we document in Part I, the Ziglar Court offered
two further reasons for its hostility to Bivens claims based on unconstitutional
policies. The first is related to the precedent-based argument canvassed
above—the Court’s statement that a Bivens suit does not provide “a proper
policy exists and was handed down by such a high-level officer—here the Attorney General
or Director of the FBI himself.”).
80 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
81 Id. at 734, 743–44.
82 572 U.S. 744 (2014).
83 Id. at 755.
84 See id. at 763–64.
85 See Brief for Petitioner at 11–14, al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (No. 10-98), 2010 WL
5087872, at *11–14 (focusing on absolute and qualified immunity); Brief for Petitioners at
19, 49, Wood, 572 U.S. 744 (No. 13-115), 2014 WL 173484, at *19, *49; Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 17–20, Wood, 572 U.S. 744 (No. 13-115), 2014 WL 984991, at *17–20.
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vehicle for altering an entity’s policy”86 —which we take to be a pragmatic
claim that Bivens actions are well suited to deter individual bad actors but
should not be used to effectuate a change in harmful policies. Second, the
Ziglar Court explained that policies should not be challenged through Bivens
actions because discovery and litigation in these actions will “require courts
to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive functions of the Executive
Branch.”87
In this Part, we explain why the Ziglar Court’s concerns—about the ability to challenge government policies through damages actions and the sensibility of these types of claims—run counter to the structure of constitutional
litigation as it has developed in connection with suits against state and local
actors under § 1983 and against federal actors under assorted statutory vehicles. The Court has long assumed that individuals harmed by an unlawful
policy can bring suit to challenge that policy as it was applied to them. The
nature of the policy may inform the manner in which the claim proceeds, but
the policy itself does not enjoy immunity from constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, contrary to the language in Ziglar, and the post-Ziglar suggestion of
some lower courts, the deterrent effect of the threat of monetary liability
does not improperly impinge on the policymaking discretion of government
actors but properly confronts those actors with incentives to comply with law.
A.

The Role of Policy Under § 1983

Policy plays an important role in defining the contours of liability under
§ 1983, but it tends to increase the range of available remedies, rather than
to constrain remedial options. Consider the important decision of Monell v.
Department of Social Services, the Court’s leading case on the liability of cities
and counties for constitutional violations under § 1983.88 There, departments of the City of New York had a policy requiring pregnant employees to
take unpaid leave before it became medically necessary.89 The district court
recognized that the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief had been mooted by
the City’s abandonment of the policy in question.90 That left the plaintiffs’
claims for damages. The Supreme Court ruled that the damages claims
should proceed against the City, overruling so much of its decision in Monroe
v. Pape as had refused to allow such suits against municipalities.91
86 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)). For further discussion of the Court’s invocation of Malesko, see
supra Part I.
87 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–61.
88 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
89 See id. at 660–61 (describing challenge to the Department’s “official policy compell[ing] pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were
required for medical reasons”).
90 Id. at 661.
91 See id. at 700–01 (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), with respect to
local government liability under § 1983).
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The Court nowhere suggested that the presence of a policy foreclosed
recovery. To the contrary, the policy in Monell was broadly applicable to a
variety of city employees and was nonetheless subject to attack in a suit for
damages and injunctive relief. The Court summarized its conclusions as
follows:
Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body’s officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 action
against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible
for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments,
like every other § 1983 “person,” by the very terms of the statute, may be
sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such a custom has not received formal approval through
the body’s official decisionmaking channels.92

The Court thus approved litigation to challenge both formal policies and
informal practices rising to the level of governmental custom. At the same
time, the Court refused to impose respondeat superior liability on local governmental bodies, concluding that such bodies were responsible for their
own policies or practices but not for the unauthorized constitutional torts
committed by their employees.93
Just as Monell subjects the governmental body to suit for its policies, so
too does the Court hold individual officials accountable when they act pursuant to a clearly unconstitutional policy. Consider, for example, the Court’s
decision in Monroe, holding a Chicago police officer legally accountable
under § 1983 for an unconstitutional intrusion into plaintiff’s home and for
later detaining the plaintiff on open charges.94 Although Justice Frankfurter
objected to imposing federal liability for random and unlawful actions that
were prohibited by state law, he agreed that the defendant was accountable
for unlawful detention on open charges pursuant to official custom.95 Since
Monroe, the Court has consistently reaffirmed that individual officials may be
held to account for constitutional torts committed pursuant to official policies and to practices and usages that rise to the level of custom for § 1983
purposes. Qualified immunity may shield officers from personal liability, but
not when the actions were taken pursuant to a clearly unconstitutional
policy.96
92 Id. at 690–91.
93 See id. at 691, 694.
94 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169, 187.
95 See id. at 258–59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745–46 (2002) (finding prison guards were subject
to personal liability and not entitled to qualified immunity when using a hitching post to
subdue and punish prisoners pursuant to Alabama state prison policy that authorized such
measures); cf. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1986) (holding county
liable for unconstitutional policy and concluding that officers violated the Constitution in
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Notably, the availability of suits for money damages to challenge an
unconstitutional policy under § 1983 does not depend on the existence, or
not, of injunctive- and declaratory-style remediation.97 The suit for injunctive relief in Monell and in other cases may succeed in disbanding an unconstitutional policy as a prospective matter, but such success will not foreclose
those injured by the policy from seeking monetary relief in an otherwise
appropriate proceeding. Monell itself proceeded to recognize the viability of
monetary claims for New York’s wrongful pregnancy policies and many other
decisions point in the same direction.98 Thus, in Hope v. Pelzer, the Court
approved personal liability for the prison guards involved in the punitive use
of a hitching post pursuant to a detention policy that a federal district court
had already enjoined in separate class action litigation.99
To be sure, remedial principles create some interdependence between
damages and injunctive relief; the traditional view was to see damages as the
primary remedy and the suit for injunctive relief as an alternative. But even
that rule, as the Supreme Court explained in Sterling v. Constantin,100 did not
foreclose injunctive relief in a proper case.101 There, the Court upheld the
issuance of injunctive relief against action taken to enforce an unconstitutional state policy, notwithstanding the State’s contention that only damages
relief was available.102
The suggestion confuses the question of judicial power with that of judicial
remedy. If the matter is one of judicial cognizance, it is because of an
alleged invasion of a right, and the judicial power necessarily extends to the
granting of the relief found to be appropriate according to the circumstances of the case. Whether or not the injured party is entitled to an injunction will depend upon equitable principles; upon the nature of the right
invaded and the adequacy of the remedy at law.103

Here, the State’s unconstitutional policy was subject to judicial attack,
whether carried out by low-level officials or by way of the declaration of martial law by the Governor.104 Both damages and, in appropriate cases, injunctive relief were available to contest the policy and obtain proper relief.105
conducting a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to the
policy but were shielded by qualified immunity).
97 In the Bivens context, in contrast, the Court has invoked the availability of remedial
alternatives to limit the right to damages. See infra Part IV.
98 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; cf. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021)
(upholding viability of suit for nominal damages to challenge university policy restricting
religious freedom after circumstances mooted claims for declaratory and injunctive relief).
99 See Hope, 536 U.S. at 744 (citing Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1244–46
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (granting class-wide injunctive relief against unconstitutional hitching
post policy)).
100 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
101 See id. at 403.
102 See id. at 404.
103 Id. at 403.
104 See id. at 393.
105 See id. at 403.
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Policy Claims Against Federal Officials

The remedial framework for suits against federal officials has also subjected to judicial scrutiny both the policies of the government and those who
carry them into effect. That was true in the nineteenth century and remains
true today, to some extent, at least outside the context of Bivens litigation.
Only when the policies in question violate a narrow set of constitutional guarantees, such as the Takings Clause, or when they operate in effect as a breach
of contract does the law foreclose officer suits. But that protection reflects
the fact that the government (rather than the individual officer) bears liability directly, typically in a suit brought against the sovereign in the court of
claims.
To see the early view of policy, consider the Court’s well-known decision
in Little v. Barreme,106 which arose during what historians refer to as the
Quasi-War between the United States and France.107 There, Captain Little
intercepted a foreign ship pursuant to the instructions he received from the
Secretary of the Navy.108 The Court found no legal basis for the ship’s capture; the policy announced by the Secretary was unlawful under the terms of
applicable law.109 In the end, the Court approved an award of damages
against Captain Little, holding him personally accountable for the government’s unlawful policy, and Congress adopted legislation to compensate Little and make the plaintiff whole for the loss suffered.110
Claims for an unlawful taking of property presented a slightly different
remedial problem. If the taking was authorized, then the law regarded the
obligation to pay just compensation as one that was owed by the government
itself as a matter of contract.111 At one time, those claims would proceed by
petition to Congress, but since 1855 have been handled by the U.S. Court of
Claims (now known as the Court of Federal Claims).112 If by contrast the
taking was unauthorized, the invasion of property rights represented a tort
and the liability was assigned to the officer who committed the taking.113
The creation of a policy, in this context, thus served to identify the responsible party for claims sounding in contract. The policy itself did not immunize
the government’s action from scrutiny but identified the proper defendant
when property was wrongly taken.
106 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
107 See id. at 173. For an account of the litigation and Little’s subsequent indemnification, see James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1877–87
(2010).
108 Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 176–78.
109 See id. at 173–75.
110 See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 107, at 1902 & n.181.
111 See James E. Pfander, Dicey’s Nightmare: An Essay on the Rule of Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
737, 742 (2019).
112 See id.
113 See id. at 768.
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Perhaps needless to say, the relationship between those detained in
Ziglar and the federal officials named as defendants was not founded on contract. The assignment of contract and takings claims to a separate tribunal
thus has no application to claims for unlawful custody and abuse—claims
that classically sound in tort and give rise to personal official liability. The
Court of Federal Claims has long been governed by a statute that deprives it
of jurisdiction over tort claims and the government has never accepted liability for the constitutional torts of its officers.114 Bivens liability has always
rested on the need to deter officers and by extension the agencies that
employ them from violating the constitutional rights of individuals. By
design, that deterrent effect encourages the adjustment of policies that
resulted in those constitutional violations. To be sure, we believe that the
Supreme Court’s descriptions of lawsuits’ deterrent signal does not reflect
the ways in which some local governments process that signal. Each of us has
described these gaps between the Court’s vision and the reality on the
ground.115 But, as the next Section shows, that research only strengthens the
case against the Ziglar Court’s novel concern with the way constitutional tort
actions influence government policy.
C.

The Court’s Longstanding Vision of Deterrence

As we established in Part I, the Ziglar Court’s citation to prior precedent
to support its hostility to policy-based claims obscures the fact that no prior
case had questioned the use of Bivens to seek redress for injuries caused by
unconstitutional policies. Similarly, the Court’s suggestion that damages
awards are ineffective at influencing policy, or even worse, pose a threat to
effective governmental operations, is new. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
long expected that damages awards against individual officers and policymakers can influence government officials to change unconstitutional policies.
Many times, the Court has applauded this type of deterrent effect, whether
directed at federal, state, or local governmental policies.116
For example, in Carlson v. Green,117 the Court wrote that a damages
award against an individual federal officer in a Bivens action can and should
114 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018) (extending jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims to constitutional and contract claims “not sounding in tort”).
115 See generally Pfander et al., supra note 4; Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success
of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809
(2010); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification].
116 See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 495 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The primary reason for imposing § 1983 liability on local government units is deterrence, so that if there is any doubt about the constitutionality of their actions, officials will
‘err on the side of protecting citizens’ rights.’” (quoting Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980))); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981)
(explaining that judgments against municipalities will cause policymakers to “discharge . . .
offending officials” and change policies); see also infra notes 117–21.
117 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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influence the behavior of both the individual defendant and their government employer.118 As the Court explained, the government argued that
“FTCA liability is a more effective deterrent because . . . the Government
would be forced to promulgate corrective policies.”119 But the Court
rejected this argument on the ground that it assumed “that the superiors
would not take the same actions when an employee is found personally liable
for violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.”120 Instead, the Court concluded, “[t]he more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors are
motivated not only by concern for the public fisc[,] but also by concern for
the Government’s integrity.”121
The patchwork of liability rules that the Court has settled on for § 1983
liability also rests on an understanding that damages awards against individual officers and municipalities can influence governmental policies. When
the Court held that municipalities were not entitled to qualified immunity, its
logic turned on its conclusion that damages awards entered against local governments and their policymakers can and should influence policies.122 As
the Court reasoned in Owen v. City of Independence:
The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct . . . should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts
about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights. Furthermore, the threat that damages
might be levied against the city may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. Such
procedures are particularly beneficial in preventing those “systemic” injuries
that result not so much from the conduct of any single individual, but from
the interactive behavior of several government officials, each of whom may
be acting in good faith.123

In contrast to the Ziglar Court’s assertion that damages actions cannot influence government policies, the Court recognized decades ago that damages
awards against individual officers or policymakers can, in fact, induce officials
to change policies. And the Court in Carlson and Owen not only accepted but
celebrated the deterrent power of these damages awards. Indeed, in the
Court’s view, the deterrent impact of damages actions is one of § 1983’s
“raisons d’être.”124
The Court’s model of individual liability in § 1983 litigation also turns
on an understanding of the deterrent impact of damages actions. Qualified
118 See id. at 21.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 651–53 (1980).
123 Id. at 651–53 (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 656 (quoting Note, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1224
(1977)); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480–81 (1986) (holding that
municipal liability can flow from the actions of a single policymaker and that denying liability “would . . . be contrary to the fundamental purpose of § 1983”).
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immunity doctrine is based precisely on the fear that damages actions will
overdeter government officials, of particular concern where policy is made.125
Nonetheless, the Court identified the need for deterrence of “recurrent constitutional violations” as a justification for permitting individual § 1983
defendants to be subjected to punitive damages, even as it barred the award
of such damages against municipalities.126 The Court has even viewed damages actions against individuals as a “more effective” deterrent than damages
actions against the entity, in both the § 1983 and Bivens contexts.127
Bivens liability, of course, does not precisely mirror that under § 1983.
But the differences only reinforce our misgivings about Ziglar’s hostility to
policy-based claims. The protections against individual liability in the Bivens
context are even greater than in § 1983, because not only can Bivens defendants invoke qualified immunity, but the defense comes into play only if the
plaintiff can show that a Bivens claim exists. Moreover, there is no Monell
parallel to Bivens, which means that there is less opportunity to bring claims
against government entities that do not enjoy the protections afforded by
qualified immunity. So to the extent that Bivens liability will deter ongoing
unconstitutional conduct, the window of opportunity is narrower than in
§ 1983.
At the same time, there are critical similarities such that, when viable
Bivens claims exist, they are just as likely as § 1983 claims to incentivize compliance with the law without creating a risk of overdeterrence. For example,
both § 1983 claims and Bivens actions can influence government behavior by
clarifying the scope of constitutional protections. Even when the Court held
in Pearson v. Callahan128 that lower courts need no longer follow the “rigid
order of battle” in sequencing qualified immunity considerations, it acknowledged that “the two-step procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent.”129 That development has concrete ramifications for
policy, even when damages claims are unsuccessful. In Camreta v. Greene,130
for instance, the defendant prevailed in the lower court on his qualified
immunity defense because, even though his actions violated the Fourth
Amendment, the relevant law was not “clearly established.”131 On certiorari,
the Court found that he had standing to seek review because, although he
had prevailed below, the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the Fourth Amendment
meant that the defendant “must either change the way he performs his duties
125 Thus, qualified immunity protected the official sued in Meyer who had carried out
the disputed policy in that case. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473–74 (1994).
126 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267–70 (1981).
127 Id. at 270 (“The Court previously has found, with respect to such violations, that a
damages remedy recoverable against individuals is more effective as a deterrent than the
threat of damages against a government employer.” (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
21 (1980))).
128 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
129 Id. at 234, 236.
130 563 U.S. 692 (2011).
131 Id. at 699.
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or risk a meritorious damages action.”132 Confronted with a determination
as to the scope of constitutional protection, governments must decide how to
adjust their policy, if at all, to ward off a repetition of future litigation.
In both liability regimes, the Court expressed concern that overdeterrence of individual defendants through the imposition of damages awards
could undermine the valuable public-regarding purposes of individual liability. The Court’s concern with overdeterrence in the context of constitutional
torts, both in Bivens and § 1983 litigation, reflects the Court’s belief that individual damages actions can influence decisionmaking.133 But the Court has
seemed particularly concerned with the ill effects of the personal liability
regime contemplated by Bivens.134 In Ziglar, the Court found this concern
particularly salient in the perceived unfairness of holding individual officers
personally accountable for their actions in formulating and carrying out government policy.135 And in Ziglar, concerns about the threat of personal liability appeared to factor into the Court’s case against the use of Bivens
litigation for policy challenges.136
These concerns had been aired before. But they were invoked by the
Ziglar Court for the first time to curtail the right to sue. In the past, the
Court has described the potential burdens on high-level officials associated
with discovery and trial when creating heightened standards for pleading and
qualified immunity.137 But the Ziglar Court was the first to advance the
notion that these types of concerns should foreclose the right to sue altogether. Critically, the Court never clarified why a damages action would present this risk but not equitable claims for injunctive relief. If anything,
equitable claims would seem to present a risk of greater intrusion, with their
potential to interfere with ongoing governmental functions.138
Indeed, we have found that the threat of individual officials’ financial
liability is illusory at best. In Bivens claims brought against federal officers
employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, we found that individual officers
132 Id. at 703.
133 For a discussion of these concerns, see Pfander et al., supra note 4; see also Sheldon
Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 279 (2010); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1811–14 (2018).
134 See Pfander et al., supra note 4, at 574–78 (describing these concerns).
135 See Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017) (“Bivens is not designed to hold
officers responsible for acts of their subordinates.” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
676 (2009))).
136 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
137 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (describing plausibility pleading rules as necessary to protect government officials from “the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating
in litigation”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (explaining that qualified
immunity is necessary to protect against the burdens of discovery and trial because
“[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government” (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982))).
138 See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949)
(expressing concern lest the government be “stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff who
presents a disputed question of property or contract right”).
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rarely contributed to settlements and judgments entered over a ten-year
period.139 Payouts did not come from the Bureau of Prison’s budget, either.
Instead, these awards were taken from the Judgment Fund, located in the
U.S. Treasury.140 In our study, we found no instance in which a supervisory
officer or high-ranking policy official was required to contribute to an
award.141 One of us has found a similar pattern in indemnification patterns
in § 1983 litigation.142 In other words, although both § 1983 and Bivens are
premised on a personal liability regime, as a practical matter they function as
an entity liability regime, with the same potential for deterrent effect that the
Court has identified in its Monell jurisprudence.
To sum up, the Ziglar Court’s description of Bivens suits’ deterrent
effects runs contrary to the Court’s longstanding vision of the ways in which
damages awards deter both individuals and entities. But recognizing this
shift is not to endorse the ways in which the Court has conceived of lawsuits’
deterrent power. As we have shown in our empirical work, individually and
collectively, the Court worries far too much about overdeterrence in the context of constitutional torts. But these observations about the mechanics of
deterrence further undermine the Ziglar Court’s reasons for suggesting that
Bivens doctrine should not embrace policy-based claims.
III.

CONFUSED APPLICATION

OF

ZIGLAR’S POLICY HOSTILITY

Apart from its failure to identify support in Bivens doctrine or in the law
of government accountability, Ziglar failed to clarify how lower courts should
apply its limits on suits challenging government policy. One might argue
that the exception applies only in connection with the Court’s evaluation of
special factors; it was in that section of the opinion in which the Court questioned the use of Bivens as a vehicle for policy challenges.143 But in an earlier section of the opinion, the Court explained that new context analysis
should consider “the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.”144 Given the novelty of its approach in Ziglar,
prior cases will have predictably failed to take account of the Court’s stated
concern with policy-based Bivens litigation. Perhaps, on that view, lower
courts will consider the presence of a disputed government policy to warrant
both a new context finding and a special factors concern.
Ziglar also does little to define what counts as a policy for purposes of
either the new context or special factors inquiry. For starters, the Court
appears to embrace a perception that policies differ from one-off actions
taken within a zone of discretion. Thus, the Court distinguished between the
detention policy at issue in Ziglar and the “harsh conditions” inflicted on the
139
140
141
142
143
144

See
Id.
See
See
See
Id.

Pfander et al., supra note 4, at 565, 594.
at 594–95.
id. at 600.
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 115, at 912–17.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).
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plaintiffs at the Metropolitan Detention Center that “were not imposed pursuant to official policy” but instead amounted to “a pattern of ‘physical and
verbal abuse.’ ”145 But the Court did not clarify the dividing line between
official policies and patterns of misconduct, or identify any requirements of
form that government decisions must display to qualify as policies for purposes of rendering Bivens inapplicable. Perhaps predictably, lower courts
have found it difficult to distinguish policy-based activities from “individual”
actions.
Courts applying Ziglar’s holding must also give some thought to which
parties should be permitted to raise the specter that a Bivens claim implicates
policy. In Ziglar itself, the Court made clear that its hostility to policy-based
claims went beyond those brought against the officials involved in the formulation of the detention policy.146 Ziglar suggested that its skepticism of policy-based claims also applied to claims against the officers who carried the
policy into effect.147 Thus, the decision apparently foreclosed detention-policy claims against both the executive officials and the wardens, leaving open
only the prisoner-abuse claims against Hasty.148 As the Court explained,
detention policy claims against any one of the defendants might lead to discovery into the formulation of government policy and to the litany of
problems that were said to flow from litigation of national security matters.149
In short, the Ziglar opinion offers little guidance to lower courts as to the
handling of policy-based Bivens claims. Justice Kennedy offered a lengthy list
of special factors but did not suggest that any one factor was to be regarded
as dispositive. Instead, he emphasized the need for a balance of competing
interests, one that took account of a “persisting concern” that, in the absence
of a Bivens remedy, “there will be insufficient deterrence to prevent officers
from violating the Constitution.”150 Justice Kennedy addressed that persisting concern in Ziglar by suggesting that other modes (injunctive and habeas
relief) were available to test the legality of many government policies, including those governing conditions of detention.151 Notably, though, the Court
stopped well short of suggesting that its new hostility to policy-based claims
came into play only where Congress had made adequate remedial alternatives available.
This Part describes the lower courts’ unsurprising division on two questions posed by Ziglar’s reasoning: First, what constitutes “policy”? Second,
which defendants may invoke Ziglar’s hostility to policy-based claims? In the
next Part, we explore the way in which lower courts have understood the
145 Id. at 1853 (quoting Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 228 (2d Cir. 2015)).
146 See id. at 1860.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 1860–61 (“Even if the action is confined to the conduct of a particular Executive Officer in a discrete instance, these claims would call into question the formulation
and implementation of a general policy.”).
150 Id. at 1863.
151 Id. at 1862–63.
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Ziglar Court’s limitations on Bivens remedies based on the availability of
remedial alternatives.
A.

Navigating the Policy Spectrum in Light of Ziglar

To put it mildly, lower courts’ decisions are not a model of clarity about
what constitutes a policy for purposes of triggering the concerns identified in
Ziglar. Many of the post-Ziglar cases arise in the prison and immigration contexts, far removed from the formulation of national security policy that seemingly animated the Court’s anxieties in Ziglar. Many of the cases, moreover,
assert claims against relatively low-level figures within the prison and immigration bureaucracies and thus fail to implicate the Court’s concern with the
protection of high-level policymakers. Despite these distinguishing factors,
however, lower courts have often, but not invariably, adopted relatively broad
definitions of policy as a bar to Bivens litigation.
At one end of the spectrum are cases that involve disputes over relatively
formal policy. In King v. Goode,152 a shakedown of plaintiff’s cell uncovered a
collection of sexually explicit materials that he described as the working manuscript of a book he was writing.153 Defendants invoked Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) Code 334, which prohibits “inmates from conducting a business without [staff] authorization.”154 On internal review, the warden expunged the
infraction and returned the manuscript, concluding that there had been no
sales of the book and the manuscript came within the scope of Program
Statement 53350.27, which states that an incarcerated person “may prepare a
manuscript for private use or for publication while in custody without staff
approval.”155 Dismissing on other grounds, the court left little doubt that it
regarded the Bivens claim as improperly contesting the formulation and
implementation of BOP policy.156 The court paid little attention to the fact
that the policy against business transactions did not appear to apply to preparation of a book manuscript, and thus failed to warrant confiscation of the
plaintiff’s materials.
Similarly, formal health care policy was at the center of litigation in New
York over the provision of dental treatment. In Ojo v. United States,157 the
plaintiff sought damages for the denial of dental care, challenging as discriminatory a Bureau of Prisons policy that inmates wait for twelve months before
receiving such care.158 According to the complaint, BOP maintained a written policy as set forth in Program Statement 6400.02, dated January 15, 2005,
152 No. 2:18-CV-00015, 2019 WL 1339605 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2019).
153 See id. at *1.
154 Id. at *1, *4.
155 Id. at *2.
156 See id. at *3–4 (dismissing on the basis that administrative review had provided an
adequate remedy, but nonetheless describing the BOP policy as the “most important ‘special factor’” against allowing a Bivens action).
157 364 F. Supp. 3d 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
158 Id. at 165–68.
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specifying a twelve-month wait for routine dental treatment.159 In addition,
the complaint alleged that the prison had an unwritten policy that discriminated against pretrial detainees by blocking them from receiving emergency
dental treatment during their detention.160 In rejecting the claim, the district court emphasized that the litigation challenged a “large-scale policy,
rather than the rogue conduct of individual employees” and implicated complex questions of “prison resource allocation.”161 Adjudication of challenges
to so broad a policy would thus necessitate an inquiry into “the discussions
and deliberations” that led to the policy and thus triggered the Ziglar Court’s
concern with policy-based Bivens litigation.162
In cases involving less formal policies, lower courts have also relied on
Ziglar to deny a Bivens remedy. In Estate of Diaz,163 suit was brought on
behalf of the estate of a person held in a federal prison who died after receiving inadequate medical treatment.164 The nub of the claim was that the warden, assistant warden, and clinical director of a prison in Florida had
adopted a policy of refusing to transfer incarcerated people for treatment by
an outside medical facility.165 While the court acknowledged that a Bivens
claim was available for deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical conditions, it focused on allegations that defendants, “in an effort to save money,
‘made and enforced a de facto policy to punish any mid-level custody official
who authorizes the transfer or transport of an inmate . . . to an outside hospital.’ ”166 Citing Ziglar, and its hostility to policy litigation, the Diaz court concluded that the claim might proceed as a challenge to intentional denial of
treatment, “but not for adoption of a policy to cut back on healthcare spending in general.”167
Even less formal was the policy at issue in Smith v. Shartle,168 a suit on
behalf of the estate of a convicted sex offender who was killed in prison by
the person who was assigned to share his cell.169 Naming the wardens of the
facility in Arizona as defendants, the complaint alleged that the prison had
failed to adopt a “system . . . to ensure [that] sex offenders were housed
separately from [those] who wished to harm them.”170 For the court, these
allegations suggested that the plaintiff sought to challenge prison policy,
despite the plaintiff’s disclaimers. That the complaint also sought declaratory and injunctive relief confirmed that the goal of the litigation was to
159 See id. at 166–67.
160 Id. at 167–68.
161 Id. at 175.
162 Id.
163 Estate of Diaz v. Cheatum, No. 1:17-CV-24108, 2019 WL 296766 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23,
2019).
164 See id. at *1.
165 Id. at *1.
166 Id. at *3 (alteration in original).
167 See id. at *3–4.
168 No. CV-18-00323, 2019 WL 2717097 (D. Ariz. June 28, 2019).
169 See id. at *2.
170 Complaint and Jury Demand at 27, Smith, 2019 WL 2717097 (No. 4:18-cv-00323).
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secure policy changes and greater protection for sex offenders. Yet, even on
the logic of Ziglar, such coercive forms of litigation can be advanced without
implicating the Court’s hostility to the use of Bivens claims to challenge
policies.171
Courts have also been faced with the question of whether conduct consistent with standard operating procedure has the status of “policy” for purposes of applying Ziglar. In Creedle v. Miami-Dade County,172 the plaintiff—a
U.S. citizen—was subjected to detention when an immigration official mistakenly and without probable cause issued a detainer against him.173 As the
court saw things, the immigration officer was acting “within the parameters
of ICE’s current practices and procedures for issuing detainers.”174 The
plaintiff’s complaint was therefore viewed by the court as targeting the
broader, general policy of issuing detainers, rather than as “seeking damages
for an unauthorized, ultra vires act done by a malicious or reckless official.”175 As a result, despite a lack of probable cause for the detainer, the
Court disallowed the Bivens claim.176
At perhaps its most extreme, some courts have applied Ziglar’s policy
skepticism even where no policy had been adopted or infringed, but because
the prospect of individual damages awards might prompt a change in policy.
In Maria S. v. Garza,177 next friends brought suit on behalf of Laura S., a
Mexican national who was taken into custody by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and allegedly coerced into signing a “voluntary” removal
form.178 Laura reportedly feared for her life in Mexico; her ex-boyfriend
had threatened to kill her.179 She explained her concerns to the CBP
officer, but he directed her to sign the relevant form.180 A few days after her
return to Mexico, the ex-boyfriend made good on his threat.181 In the
course of rejecting the Bivens claim, the Fifth Circuit did not identify any
formal policy. But it nonetheless found that due process challenges to allegedly coerced agreements to accept voluntary removal could trigger a “tidal
wave of litigation”182 and would “likely force CBP to change policies and procedures, even to adopt excessive precautions to prevent potential liability.”183
Such policy and procedure changes were “for the Congress, not the Judiciary” to address.184 As a result, the Bivens claim could not proceed.
171 See Smith, 2019 WL 2717097, at *2–4.
172 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
173 Id. at 1282.
174 Id. at 1315.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 912 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2019).
178 Id. at 781–82.
179 Id. at 781.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 782.
182 Id. at 785 (quoting De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 379 (5th Cir. 2015)).
183 Id.
184 Id. (quoting Hernández v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 821 (5th Cir. 2018)).
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Several courts, however, have refused to follow the Fifth Circuit in
rejecting Bivens claims in situations where the imposition of liability might
impede policy discretion. Thus, in Bistrian v. Levi,185 the Third Circuit
allowed a claim to proceed against prison officials who placed the plaintiff in
the yard and then failed to intervene when he was savagely beaten.186 The
court acknowledged that allowing the claim to proceed will “unavoidably
implicate ‘policies regarding inmate safety and security.’ ”187 But that would
be true, the court explained, “of practically all claims arising in a prison.”188
Observing that failure-to-protect claims had long been allowed, the court saw
little reason to believe that allowing such claims would undercut executive
branch authority to set and administer prison policy.189
Other courts have reached conclusions similar to Bistrian, rejecting
defendants’ arguments that excessive force or failure to protect claims implicate policy. For example, a district court judge in the Central District of California refused to dismiss a Bivens claim against corrections officers who had
used force against the plaintiff and then retaliated against him for complaining about his treatment, concluding that the claims at issue “involve two
individual officers, and their individual actions—not large-scale government
policies . . . [that] implicate national security, executive policy, or the other
largely political concerns addressed in Ziglar.”190 A district court judge in
the District of Colorado similarly refused to dismiss claims against BOP
officers who told other incarcerated people sensitive information about the
plaintiff and his crimes, with the intention that those inmates would “retaliate violently” against the plaintiff.191 The court explained that this suit challenged “day-to-day prison operations,” not “complex matters of BOP
policymaking,” and that only money damages provided an adequate remedy
for the past dissemination of information about him.192 And in a Bivens
action against an officer who failed to protect the plaintiff from assault in
prison, a judge in the Northern District of Ohio rejected a summary judgment motion invoking the policy exemption, reasoning that the case involved
an “individual instance of law enforcement overreach.”193
Courts have also rejected the applicability of the policy exception in
cases involving low-level officers in contexts that, at least conceptually, are
more closely tied to national security concerns than cases arising in the BOP.
185 912 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2018).
186 Id. at 83.
187 Id. at 93 (quoting Brief on Behalf of Appellant Lt. James Gibbs at 19, Bistrian, 912
F.3d 79 (No. 18-2011), 2018 WL 3571053, at *19).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Jerra v. United States, No. 2:12-cv-01907, 2018 WL 1605563, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29,
2018).
191 Cuevas v. United States, No. 16-cv-00299, 2018 WL 1399910, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 19,
2018).
192 Id. at *4.
193 Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:10-CV-02404, 2019 WL 4694217, at
*14 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2019).
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For example, a judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed an excessive force claim to proceed against a Secret Service agent, despite the argument that the officer was working a national security detail that implicated
Ziglar’s policy concerns.194 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Lanuza v. Love195
allowed a Bivens claim to proceed against an immigration official who falsified documents at an immigration hearing.196 The court first rejected the
argument that immigration proceedings invariably implicate national security concerns; the plaintiff had no ties to terrorism and his was a “run-of-themill immigration proceeding.”197 Next, the court specifically rejected the
claim that all actions taken by immigration officers necessarily implicate
immigration policy; the “illogical nature of such a reading,” the court found,
was “demonstrated by the absurdity of its results.”198
B.

Defendants Entitled to Claim the Policy Exemption

Circuit and district courts also have read Ziglar to reflect greater skepticism for claims brought against comparatively high-ranking government officials than their lower-level counterparts. In one suit, naming the U.S. Postal
Service and the Postmaster General, a Missouri district court had little difficulty in concluding that the litigation would implicate the formulation and
enforcement of government policies, leading to the sort of burdensome discovery that the Ziglar Court found troublesome.199 Similarly, a federal court
in northern Virginia rejected Fourth Amendment claims against the former
Attorney General and another high-ranking official in the Department of Justice who were said to have authorized an electronic eavesdropping program
to prevent leaks to the media.200
Even officials who occupy positions less exalted than those of Postmaster
General and Attorney General have successfully claimed that Bivens litigation
might implicate policy and thereby run afoul of Ziglar’s instructions. In one
case, for example, a district court in the Southern District of California dismissed a Bivens claim brought by a plaintiff who sought to hold a border
patrol officer and the chief of the agency accountable for a death that
resulted from a cross-border shooting because the shooting was caused by an
“alleged policy . . . that authorized agents to use deadly force in response to
individuals throwing rocks.”201 Similarly, in Ojo, mentioned previously, an
incarcerated person brought suit against the assistant warden and medical
194 See Graber v. Dales, No. 18-3168, 2019 WL 4805241, at *2–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30,
2019).
195 899 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2018).
196 Id. at 1029–30.
197 Id. at 1030.
198 Id. at 1029.
199 See Jackson v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 4:18CV500, 2019 WL 1331636, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 25, 2019).
200 See Attkisson v. Holder, No. 1:17-cv-364, 2017 WL 5013230, at *5–8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1,
2017).
201 See Del Socorro Quintero Perez v. Diaz, 331 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2017).
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director of the Brooklyn facility in which he was housed.202 The court in Ojo
exempted these “high-level MDC officials” from liability, in part because they
were being sued for carrying out Bureau of Prison policy that had been formulated at an even higher level.203
Such applications of Ziglar’s policy exemption pose real challenges for
litigants seeking redress for unconstitutional forms of medical care. If, as in
Ojo, the policy exemption protects both the policy itself and all those who
carried it into effect but had no hand in its drafting, then it could foreclose
suit against all potentially responsible parties. Similarly, in Estate of Diaz, if
the policy itself triggers the exemption, and exempts both the wardens who
fashioned the policy and the low-level officials who carried it into effect, then
the policy exemption potentially threatens the viability of established claims
for unconstitutional medical care.204 Policy as deployed in Estate of Diaz
might conceivably foreclose suit against deliberately indifferent superior
officers and the low-level officials who were actively involved in delivering
inadequate medical care in question.205 The foreclosure of all conceivable
forms of relief raises serious concerns, as the next Part briefly explains.
IV.

DEFINING ZIGLAR’S POLICY EXEMPTION
ALTERNATIVES

IN

LIGHT

OF

REMEDIAL

The Ziglar Court’s hostility toward policy claims can most charitably be
understood, we believe, as an extension of its longstanding preference for
the use of alternative remedies, including claims for injunctive or declaratory
relief or release from custody on habeas corpus.206 The Court thus appeared
to perceive a difference between litigation aimed at contesting the legality of
broad-based government policies and litigation that focuses on the actions of
particular officers. Consider the Court’s account in Ziglar:
Unlike the plaintiffs in [earlier Bivens] cases, respondents do not challenge
individual instances of discrimination or law enforcement overreach, which
202 See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Ojo v. United
States, 364 F. Supp. 3d 163, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)).
203 See Ojo, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 176.
204 See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Estate of Diaz
v. Cheatum, No. 1:17-CV-24108, 2019 WL 296766 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2019)).
205 Some courts no doubt fear that accepting such claims would contravene the Court’s
admonition that respondeat superior liability is unavailable in Bivens (or, relatedly, in
§ 1983) litigation. After all, this was one of the justifications offered by Ziglar when it
announced its hostility to policy-based claims. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860
(2017) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). The flaw in the Ziglar Court’s
analogy to supervisory liability is that, even as Iqbal restated the established rule that supervisory liability could not be based on respondeat superior liability, it also comprehended
Bivens claims based on a defendant’s violation of their “superintendent responsibilities.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Insisting that claims against supervisors be based on their own
unconstitutional conduct is perfectly consistent with holding officials accountable for the
harms caused by their own unconstitutional policies.
206 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561–62 (2007); Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 (2001).
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due to their very nature are difficult to address except by way of damages
actions after the fact. Respondents instead challenge large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of
prisoners. To address those kinds of decisions, detainees may seek injunctive relief. And in addition to that, we have left open the question whether
they might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.207

In this telling, litigants should use suits for injunctive relief, or perhaps
habeas petitions, to contest the “large-scale” policies of the government. Bivens suits for damages remain available only to address individual instances of
official misconduct for which injunctive and habeas relief may not be available.208 The Court’s preference for injunctive and declaratory forms of relief
would explain its otherwise curious invocation of those remedies in the Ziglar
case; indeed, the Court recognized that “if equitable remedies prove insufficient, a damages remedy might be necessary to redress past harm and deter
future violations.”209 The preference also makes sense of what the Court
described in Ziglar as its “persisting” concern with deterring “violat[ions]” of
the Constitution.210
On this view of Ziglar, the existence of a government policy does not
immunize government action from constitutional scrutiny. Instead, Ziglar
expresses a preference for the adjudication of challenges to policy other than
through suits for money. That means that Ziglar might tend to foreclose
challenges to government policies in circumstances where the law provides
other forms of remediation (suits for injunctive, declaratory, or administrative review). In circumstances where no such alternative exists, either as a
practical or formal matter, Ziglar could be understood to instruct lower
courts to refrain from adopting a policy characterization that would effectively immunize the government’s action from all constitutional scrutiny.
We describe this as a charitable view because the Court has not only
made Bivens claims harder to bring but has made these alternative remedies
more difficult to achieve, as well. The Court has taken pains to make it
harder to bring injunctive claims against government officials, even as it has
cast doubt on the viability of damages claims, raising the question of whether
207 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
208 The Court relied on this distinction when assessing the propriety of claims against
the high-ranking architects of the detention policy at issue in Ziglar (referred to in the
opinion as the “Executive Officials”) and claims against those who carried out the policy.
Id. at 1860. The Court drew a distinction between the two kinds of claims, foreclosing
challenges to the wardens’ implementation of the broader policy but leaving open the
possibility that the plaintiffs might recover for deliberate indifference to abusive conditions. The Court thus remanded the abusive detention claims for further proceedings,
even as it foreclosed further litigation of detention policy claims.
209 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. The Court reprised this concern in its recent decision in
Tanzin v. Tanvir, in which it observed that damages are not just “appropriate” relief in suits
against government employees but “also the only form of relief that can remedy some
RFRA violations.” 141 S. Ct. 486, 492 (2020).
210 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863.
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this Court thinks any constitutional remediation is appropriate.211 And the
Court’s habeas doctrine makes relief through this vehicle exceedingly difficult as well.212 We also view with skepticism the Court’s claim in Ziglar that
damages claims are more burdensome, from a practical perspective, than
claims seeking injunctive relief. We thus continue to call upon the Court to
revisit its hostility to the use of Bivens and its newly restrictive approach to
matters of policy in Ziglar.
But for lower courts obliged to make sense of Ziglar in the meantime, we
suggest that the existence of remedial alternatives may offer a useful analytical structure for the fraught process of divining the contours of the new policy restriction. Consider the California district court’s decision in Hodges v.
Matevousian213 and its handling of remedial alternatives in the course of
rejecting a Bivens claim to challenge prison lighting policy.214 The court
indicated that suit for injunctive relief was the proper mode of contesting
large-scale policy decisions such as a lighting policy that would affect hundreds of prisoners.215 The court relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision
rejecting a challenge to the handling of prison mail.216 There, the Ninth
Circuit found that injunctive and declaratory relief were available to test the
prison mail policy and declined to allow an action under Bivens to
proceed.217
Other courts, however, have failed to take proper account of remedial
alternatives in the course of litigation over the scope of a Bivens policy-based
claim. Consider, for example, the decision in Smith v. Shartle, denying a Bivens action brought to challenge the prison’s failure to protect a sex offender
from inmate violence.218 The Arizona court found that the plaintiffs, suing
on behalf of a prisoner who was killed while in custody, were seeking to
recover damages for the wardens’ “failure to create a policy that protected
sex offenders.”219 Whatever one might say about the plaintiff’s standing to
pursue such a policy-based failure-to-protect claim while still alive and subject
to continued incarceration, one has difficulty understanding how the representatives of a deceased prisoner have standing to pursue anything but a
claim for damages for the housing decision that led to the prisoner’s death.
211 David Rudovsky has referred to this as a classic “shell game.” David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
1199, 1212–13.
212 See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1223–44
(2015).
213 No. 1:18-cv-00790, 2019 WL 5566055 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019).
214 Id. at *3–6.
215 Id. at *6.
216 Id.
217 See Zavala v. Rios, 721 F. App’x 720, 721 (9th Cir. 2018).
218 No. CV-18-00323, 2019 WL 2717097 (D. Ariz. June 28, 2019).
219 Id. at *2.
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It makes little sense to deny the damages claim on the ground that it implicates a policy where prospective relief cannot be obtained.
A similarly disabling interpretation foreclosed a Bivens action seeking
class-wide nominal damages for injuries allegedly inflicted by actions of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement.220 Concluding that suits for nominal damages operate as the functional equivalent of declaratory relief, the California
district court dismissed the action after invoking the Supreme Court’s admonition that “a Bivens action is not ‘a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s
policy.’ ”221 But the court failed to explain why a suit recharacterized as
essentially aimed at securing declaratory relief would implicate Ziglar’s conception of Bivens litigation as a remedy of last resort. After all, suits for
declaratory relief often appropriately seek to contest or alter government policy by asking the court to declare the rights of the parties and do so, like suits
for nominal damages, without posing a threat of personal liability for the
responsible officials. Such a suit might fairly be said to fall on the preferred
rather than disfavored side of the remedial line.
The Fifth Circuit’s definition of policy in the Maria S. case was similarly
flawed.222 In that case, as described above, a Mexican national was coerced
into signing a removal form and was then returned to Mexico and killed.223
The court was doubtless correct to recognize that the threat of litigation and
the prospect of damages liability can lead agencies to alter their policies;
indeed, one would worry about the structure of our system of constitutional
remedies if such were not the case. But if the hostility against Bivens policy
claims was limited to cases in which alternative remedial measures were available, then the dismissal of the Bivens claim in Maria S. was in error. One in
the position of the claimant could not, by filing a suit for injunctive relief or
petition under the Administrative Procedure Act, effectively seek review of
the inchoate policies that might emerge from the combined impact of successful constitutional tort litigation.224 All such claims would be subject to
220 See Lucas R. v. Azar, No. CV 18-5741, 2019 WL 6655262, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2019).
221 Id. at *3 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017)).
222 See Maria S. v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2019).
223 See id. at 781–82.
224 The Fifth Circuit in Maria S. viewed the threat of a “tidal wave” of litigation as a
factor that might encourage the adoption of a new policy aimed at reducing the likelihood
of future violations. Id. at 785. But the creation of such incentive effects, an obvious consequence of tort-based liability, would not necessarily lead to the articulation of a policy
that the public could effectively challenge though declaratory forms of litigation.
Whatever the range of policy options available to an agency, their mere existence would
not warrant the exercise of judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for
review of “final” agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018). Inchoate policies do not qualify as
final within the meaning of the statute. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)
(defining final agency action as “consummation” of an agency’s decision-making process,
by which “rights or obligations have been determined,” or from which “legal consequences
will flow” (first quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113
(1948); and then quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl.,
400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970))). From our perspective, then, the inability of a litigant to chal-
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dismissal as hypothetical, speculative, and unripe. Such a vantage point
allows us to see that policy implications should never rise to the level of a
policy for Ziglar purposes. Indeed, if the Fifth Circuit’s analysis takes hold, it
could effectively foreclose constitutional oversight altogether, thus undercutting the Court’s persisting—if tepid—concern with constitutional remediation through Bivens.
CONCLUSION
The unprecedented nature of the Court’s hostility to policy-based claims
offers a clue to the problem at the heart of Ziglar: a policy exemption makes
no sense in light of the framework within which courts ensure government
accountability. To be sure, as Marbury v. Madison225 confirms, the Constitution confers discretion on executive officials, creating a space where they can
conduct the nation’s affairs subject to the control of the ballot box rather
than the courts.226 Similarly, the Constitution empowers Congress to create
an executive branch that exercises policymaking discretion within boundaries specified by law. But the deference owed to government policy extends
only to the policymaking space that the Constitution and laws lawfully confer.
When government officials exceed those boundaries and inflict injuries on
people, whether by wrongful seizure or detention, the fact that they do so
pursuant to a “policy” should make absolutely no difference.
The Court might nonetheless fairly claim some control over the manner
in which individuals subjected to unconstitutional government action pursue
remedies for the violations in question. In some instances, as when the Court
sets out to change the rules, suits for coercive relief (injunctions and habeas)
may make more sense than suits for damages. In other instances, ordinary
review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act will suffice
to ensure government accountability. But in many instances where the government adopts a policy that evades judicial review in the ordinary course
(torture, clandestine detention), a suit for damages under Bivens will provide
the only vehicle by which individuals can seek redress and courts can police
the constitutional boundaries of executive action. The test of legality in such
cases cannot turn on the presence or absence of a policy, an inevitably slippery construct as we have seen, but must focus on the constitutionality of
action taken. When the Court rejects a Bivens action in circumstances where
it provides the only effective remedy for an unconstitutional policy, it has
inverted our tradition and placed the executive above the Constitution. It
has, in short, gone rogue.

lenge policy implications through an alternative proceeding confirms that such implications should not displace federal authority to offer Bivens relief.
225 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
226 Id. at 166.
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